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OPEN
REVIEW ARTICLE
Incentivising innovation in antibiotic drug discovery
and development: progress, challenges and next steps
Victoria L Simpkin1, Matthew J Renwick1, Ruth Kelly1 and Elias Mossialos1,2
Political momentum and funding for combatting antimicrobial resistance (AMR) continues to build. Numerous major
international and national initiatives aimed at ﬁnancially incentivising the research and development (R&D) of antibiotics have
been implemented. However, it remains unclear how to effectively strengthen the current set of incentive programmes to further
accelerate antibiotic innovation. Based on a literature review and expert input, this study ﬁrst identiﬁes and assesses the major
international, European Union, US and UK antibiotic R&D funding programmes. These programmes are then evaluated across
market and public health criteria necessary for comprehensively improving the antibiotic market. The current set of incentive
programmes are an important initial step to improving the economic feasibility of antibiotic development. However, there appears
to be a lack of global coordination across all initiatives, which risks duplicating efforts, leaving funding gaps in the value chain
and overlooking important AMR goals. This study ﬁnds that incentive programmes are overly committed to early-stage push
funding of basic science and preclinical research, while there is limited late-stage push funding of clinical development.
Moreover, there are almost no pull incentives to facilitate transition of antibiotic products from early clinical phases to
commercialisation, focus developer concentration on the highest priority antibiotics and attract large pharmaceutical companies
to invest in the market. Finally, it seems that antibiotic sustainability and patient access requirements are poorly integrated into
the array of incentive mechanisms.
The Journal of Antibiotics (2017) 70, 1087–1096; doi:10.1038/ja.2017.124; published online 1 November 2017
INTRODUCTION
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global health crisis now. At the
current rate of emergence and spread of AMR, annual loss of life is
expected to reach 10 million deaths by 2050 with an estimated
economic cost of $100 trillion.1 Effectively combating AMR requires a
multifaceted approach that facilitates sustainable and equitable use of
antimicrobials, thwarts the spread of infectious disease, preserves
existing antimicrobial therapies and fosters innovation of new
therapies and diagnostic tools. A critical component of the AMR
solution is the development of truly novel antibiotic drugs to cover the
diminishing effectiveness of existing antibiotics that are relied on every
day for essential clinical care. However, due to a variety of inherent
market failures, the present business model for antibiotics has not
adequately responded to the growing demand for innovation.2–4
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that the antibiotic development pipeline
has been substantially reinvigorated in response to the growing
emergency. The Pew Trust estimates that as of March 2017, there
are 39 antibiotics in Phases I to III of the development pipeline.
However, further investigation reveals that the current antibiotic
pipeline is not robust enough to address the current and projected
clinical need.5,6 First, the success rates of moving an antibiotic through
the different clinical phases suggests that of the 39 drugs in
development, only 13 (33%) will translate into a marketable
product.7 Second, most new antibiotics do not have the novel
mechanisms of action or novelty in chemical matter targeting well-
validated targets, which are necessary to signiﬁcantly ensure effective-
ness against resistant pathogens.8 Many of the products in the pipeline
are redevelopments or combinations of existing compounds. Third,
many of these drugs do not target the highest priority antibiotic
resistant pathogens. The Pew Trust analysis shows that only 31% of
drugs in development would be active against an ESKAPE pathogen
and 33% would be active against a US Centre for Disease Control
urgent threat pathogen.6
Scientiﬁc and clinical advancements in antibiotic development are
inherently challenging, particularly relative to other therapeutic ﬁelds.
Many large capital companies have exited the antibiotic space in
favour of more proﬁtable therapeutic ventures. Small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) have attempted to ﬁll this void but generally
lack the capital and resources to undertake intensive and long-term
research and development (R&D).9,10 Consequently, the low hanging
fruit of antibiotic development, such as compound redevelopments
and combinations, has been tapped. This leaves behind the complex
and expensive task of discovering and developing truly novel
mechanisms of action that are effective against the most resistant
pathogens.11 Some companies are choosing to focus development
efforts on alternatives to antibiotics such as antibodies, probiotics,
lysins and bacteriophages.
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During the past decade, over 50 major international and national
initiatives aimed at incentivising antibiotic R&D have been imple-
mented such as the Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial
Resistance (JPIAMR), the Innovative Medicines Initiative’s (IMI’s)
New Drugs for Bad Bugs (ND4BB) programme, Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority’s (BARDA) Broad Spectrum
Antimicrobials Program and Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria
Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X).8 Political momentum for
combatting AMR continues to build. Coming out of the 2016 G20
Meeting and the United Nations General Assembly’s High-Level
Meeting on AMR, political leaders have committed to continued
actions that foster antibiotic R&D.12,13 In March 2017, the UN
announced the establishment of an Inter-Agency Coordination Group
on AMR to provide practical guidance to ensure sustainable, effective
global action to address AMR with a mandate to report back on
progress to the United Nations General Assembly 73rd session
running from September 2018 to September 2019.14 It remains
unclear, however, how to most effectively capitalise on the existing
R&D incentive programmes.
In a 2015 review article in The Journal of Antibiotics, Renwick et al.15
presented a conceptual framework for evaluating incentive pro-
grammes and assisting policy makers in selecting appropriate incen-
tives. The framework incorporates market criteria necessary for
attracting and supporting investment in antibiotic R&D and public
health objectives that attend to sustainability and patient access goals.
In the present study, we apply this conceptual framework to analyse
the major global and European Union R&D initiatives, as well as
national R&D programmes in the United States and United Kingdom.
We then identify gaps in the current initiative provisions and provide
recommendations for how the global community can further improve
the market for antibiotics in a way that is sustainable and equitable.
METHODOLOGY
Our research methodology involved three phases: a literature review,
expert input and initiative analysis. Owing to the sheer number of
initiatives worldwide that target antibiotic R&D, this review was
limited to initiatives at multi-lateral, EU, US, and UK levels. The US
and UK are two of the most active countries with regards to
developing and implementing dedicated R&D initiatives on AMR
and thus were the focus of our national level analysis. This study
further focuses on the initiatives that provide direct antibiotic R&D
incentives backed by funding or regulatory support.
Literature review
Through a semi-systematic literature review we identiﬁed current and
proposed policy initiatives that foster R&D. We reviewed relevant
peer-reviewed articles with the use of MEDLINE (PubMed), Embase
(Ovid) and Web of Science. Search terms included: ‘antibiotic’,
‘antimicrobial’, ‘antibacterial’, ‘resistance’, ‘resistant’, ‘alternative’,
‘diagnostic’, ‘devices’, ‘research’, ‘development’, ‘incentive’, ‘policy’,
‘mechanism’, ‘business model’, ‘strategy’ and ‘instrument’. The search
was restricted to papers published in the last 5 years, in English, and
either comments, editorials, journal articles, reviews or systematic
reviews. Additional non-peer reviewed literature was included in this
report and identiﬁed through a Google search and from citations in
several key papers and publication archives on relevant websites.
Figure 1 List of organisations that provided expert input on the compilation and basic assessment of identiﬁed R&D initiatives.
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Expert opinion
Once an initial compilation of initiatives had been established, we
solicited expert input to ensure that we had correct information and
had not missed any pertinent initiatives (Figure 1). Experts related to
an initiative provided feedback regarding their initiative’s priorities,
operational programmes, R&D incentive mechanisms and funding.
Further telephone interviews were conducted with select experts to
learn more about particular major initiatives. The analyses and
discussion of this report are based on the authors’ assessment and
do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of the experts consulted in the
process.
Initiative assessment
All initiatives were then analysed using an assessment framework
for antibiotic R&D incentive packages developed by Renwick et al.15
The framework can be broken down into three successive levels
that examine economic, public health and feasibility criteria
(Figure 2). The ﬁrst step involves evaluating an initiative’s core
economic incentives that address key criteria necessary for rebalan-
cing the antibiotics market. This core incentive package must
improve the net present value (NPV) of antibiotic project devel-
opment, make antibiotic development possible for SMEs, encou-
rage participation of large pharmaceutical companies and foster
synergy among all stakeholders in the market. NPV is a proﬁtability
metric that sums a project’s total revenues and costs, corrected for
the time value of money and the project’s risk of failure. The
second level of assessment examines an initiative’s ability to address
public health goals pertaining to clinical need, antibiotic sustain-
ability and patient access to necessary antibiotics. The last step
considers the package’s implementation and operational feasibility.
This ﬁnal step of evaluation will not be applied in this assessment
given that we are concerned with initiatives that have already been
implemented.
RESULTS
The results section will present short case studies of each of the
initiatives that were assessed. We provide a summary of an initiative’s
background, incentive package, targeted R&D barriers and funding
(Supplementary File). In addition, we offer a brief analysis of the
initiatives according to our framework assessment (Table 1).
Multi-lateral initiatives
Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Resistance. The
JPIAMR is an international effort focused on streamlining and
coordinating research in an effort to combat AMR.16 It was established
in 2011 and currently has 22 member states. It provides international
coordination to direct national funding towards research projects that
ﬁll key knowledge gaps in AMR. The ﬁrst call to action speciﬁcally
focused on ‘innovative approaches to address antibacterial resis-
tance’.17
To date, the total budget of supported projects is £41.65 million,
although this extends more broadly than antibiotic R&D. Push
incentives are provided in the form of direct research funding and
an international forum for research collaboration allowing the
potential to share novel research, minimise duplication and pool
funding resources. The projects mainly target basic and preclinical
research, primarily beneﬁting academics.16 Athough the JPIAMR as a
whole promotes antibiotic conservation and patient access, this focus
on the early stages of the value chain means that these incentives do
not particularly reinforce stewardship programmes or patient access to
developed antibiotics down the line.
Global Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership. Global
Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership (GARDP), a not-
for-proﬁt entity, was launched in May 2016. It is now in its incubation
phase hosted by the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative in
collaboration with the World Health Organisation.18 The aim is to
develop novel antibiotics, focusing on R&D gaps in which neither
industry nor academia are currently engaging, as well as to promote
their responsible use and ensure equitable access.
GARDP has received seed funding and pledges exceeding €5 million
for 2016–2018. It aims to target all stages of the value chain from basic
research to commercialisation. The partnership model allows pooling
of expertise to develop priority target product proﬁles. It offers push
mechanisms in the form of direct funding, but will also pilot the use of
alternative incentive models that contribute to conservation of, and
access to, new antibiotics. These include pull mechanisms such as
milestone prizes and delinking the cost of R&D from volume-
based sales and prices of antibiotics.18 The strong emphasis on
collaboration with stakeholders encourages synergy across the
antibiotic market.
Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator.
CARB-X, a global –private partnership, was launched in July 2016
with the mission to accelerate a diverse portfolio of at least 20 high-
quality antibacterial products towards clinical development.19 CARB-X
has currently received a $250 million commitment from BARDA over
5 years with contributory funds from the Wellcome Trust and the
AMR Centre in the UK, with total funding of $350 million over 5
years. MassBio and the California Life Sciences Institute, two life
science accelerators, alongside other partners will provide support for
early-stage antibiotic development. Although the leadership is initially
trans-Atlantic, the structure is designed to accept additional partners
from other regions.
CARB-X predominantly uses push incentives by providing match-
ing funding and technical assistance, including business support,
mentoring and research support services, to developers for deﬁned
projects. It supports projects targeting high-priority medical needsFigure 2 Framework evaluation.
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from the basic and preclinical research stage up to phase 1 clinical
trials.20 In its ﬁrst year, the CARB-X portfolio will primarily focus on
therapeutics treating Gram-negative bacteria on the Serious or Urgent
Threat List prepared by the Centre for Disease Control.21 The services
are available to product developers from any country, and both public
and private organisations can apply. CARB-X has announced the
initial portfolio of companies; they have selected 11 companies (8
based in the US and 3 in the UK) to be supported with $24 million.
There may be up to a further $24 million in milestone-based
additional payments over 3 years.22 Similar to other programmes that
provide only push funding to the initial stages of R&D, stewardship
and patient access programmes are not explicitly supported by CARB-
X incentives.
European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership. The
European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership
(EDCTP) was formed in 2003, followed by EDCTP2 in 2014, and is
an evolving public–public partnership between 14 European countries,
14 African countries and the EU, in collaboration with the pharma-
ceutical industry. It aims to support the acceleration of new clinical
trial interventions to prevent and treat HIV/AIDs, tuberculosis,
malaria and neglected infectious diseases, including certain bacterial
infections, in sub-Saharan Africa.23 The funding for EDCTP2 (2014–
2024) is estimated to be €2 billion, double the funding of the EDCTP
(2003–2013).
The EDCTP provides a push incentive in the form of direct funding
for R&D resources and infrastructure required to move a drug
Table 1 Overview of the analysis of initiatives supporting antibiotic R&D
Abbreviations: AMR, antimicrobial resistance; BARDA, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority; BSA, Broad Spectrum Antimicrobials; CARB-X, Combating Antibiotic Resistant
Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator; DG-RTD, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Commission; EDCTP, European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership;
EMA, European Medicines Agency; FDA, US Food and Drug Administration; GAMRIF, Global Antimicrobial Resistance Innovation Fund; GARDP, Global Antibiotic Research and Development
Partnership; IMI, Innovative Medicines Initiative; JPIAMR, Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Resistance; ND4BB, New Drugs for Bad Bugs; NIHR, National Institute for Health Research;
NIH, National Institutes of Health; NPV, net present value; R&D, research and development; SME, small- and medium-sized enterprise.
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candidate through the clinical development phases. It targets all
clinical trial phases I to IV and has been successful in fostering
R&D of antibiotics and related products as evidenced by its extensive
drug development portfolio. It is unclear how, if at all, the EDCTP
pulls potential novel antibiotics through the market approval stages
and commercialisation process. Furthermore, the industry partnership
is heavily weighted towards large capital pharmaceutical companies
rather than SMEs. The EDCTP’s ultimate goal of improving access to
effective treatments aligns well with current public health priorities but
the initiative does not have direct means to facilitate the appropriate
use of antibiotics that are produced through the initiative.
Global Antimicrobial Resistance Innovation Fund. The UK AMR
Review recommended that signiﬁcant investment in a fund was
needed to tackle AMR globally.24 In late 2016, an expert advisory
board was appointed to support Global Antimicrobial Resistance
Innovation Fund’s strategy. The UK government has committed £50
million until 2021 to work with global public and private partners to
fund innovative initiatives to tackle drug-resistant infections following
a One Health approach. The Global Antimicrobial Resistance Innova-
tion Fund will focus on organisations struggling to access traditional
ﬁnancing routes, for example, SMEs. Initially, the UK is investing £10
million with matched funding from China and private businesses.25
How the remaining £40 m is to be invested is yet to be announced.
European Union initiatives
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Commission.
The Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European
Commission (DG-RTD) is one of the largest funding bodies support-
ing the R&D of antibiotics, alternative medicines and diagnostic
tools.26 The funding comes from Framework Program 6, Framework
Program 7 (FP7) and Framework Program 8 known as Horizon 2020.
Two of the largest funding programmes operating under the partial
governance of the DG-RTD are the IMI and EDCTP. The DG-RTD
has committed €317 million to the IMI for antibiotic R&D through
the ND4BB Program and €683 million has been committed to the
EDCTP2 between 2014 and 2024. The DG-RTD also funds individual
R&D projects beyond their dedicated AMR programmes. Between
2007 and 2013, the DG-RTD spent €235.6 million on therapeutic and
diagnostic projects separate from the IMI and EDCTP.27
The DG-RTD predominantly uses push incentives such as direct
project funding, and research grants and fellowships. It provides
speciﬁc funding opportunities for SME ventures such as the SME
Instrument. The funded projects, however, vary in scope and size,
making it difﬁcult to accurately assess the effectiveness of the
individual initiatives. There is the Horizon 2020 Better Use of
Antibiotics €1 m Prize for developing a rapid-point-of-care test to
identify patients with upper respiratory tract infections that can be
treated without antibiotics which, although an interesting pull
incentive, is a relatively small reward.28 The DG-RTD brings together
key stakeholders throughout the antibiotic value chain.
ND4BB and IMI. Launched in 2008, the IMI is a public–private
partnership between the EU and the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations.29 The second iteration
of IMI was launched in 2014. The ND4BB programme is an IMI
partnership established in 2012, tasked with improving the discovery
and development of novel antibiotics for humans.30 The ND4BB
comprised seven core projects with a total budget of €700 million, of
which €317 is contributed by the European Commission’s FP7 and
€345 is in-kind contributions from the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations.
This initiative targets all aspects of the antibiotic value chain and the
public–private partnership model employed throughout seems to be
effective at pooling resources, facilitating collaboration among key
stakeholders in the development process and sharing the ﬁnancial risk
of R&D outlays. With the exception of ENABLE and DRIVE-AB,
ND4BB programmes primarily engage large pharmaceutical compa-
nies and not SMEs.31
InnovFin infectious disease ﬁnance facility. Launched in 2014, Innov-
Fin Infectious Diseases is a ﬁnancial instrument jointly developed by
the European Commission and European Investment Bank. InnovFin
Infectious Disease offers loans between €7.5 and €75 million for the
development of innovative vaccines, drugs, medical and diagnostic
devices, and novel research infrastructures for combatting infectious
diseases.32 It is a risk-sharing initiative, as the loan is only paid back if
the project is successful.
In theory, this late-stage push funding is available to large
pharmaceutical companies, SMEs, research outﬁts and universities
and non-proﬁt entities. Eligible projects, however, must have sur-
passed the initial basic research and preclinical phases of development,
which may block the participation of smaller organisations without the
capital for initial testing. Furthermore, given the signiﬁcant cost of
clinical trials the loan sizes may be considered unsatisfactory support
by potential loan applicants.8,33 It is unclear how the InnovFin
Infectious Disease Eligibility Committee selects projects and there is
a risk that these projects do not reﬂect global priorities on AMR.
United States initiatives
National Institutes of Health. The National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases is the primary government agency within the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) that funds antibiotic R&D from
basic research through to clinical development. It provides access to its
vast network of R&D infrastructure, scientiﬁc expertise, and public
and private partners. Over the past 5 years, the NIH allocated $341
million (~1.2% of the NIH’s budget) annually on average to projects
on AMR.3,24
The NIH’s pipeline levers are heavily push-based, including direct
project grants and research grants and fellowships. The Antimicrobial
Resistance Diagnostic Challenge, a joint effort between the NIH and
BARDA, awards $20 million for the development of a rapid diagnostic
test that can improve treatment of drug resistant infections. Although
the diagnostic prize is a notable step towards outcome-based pull
mechanisms, it remains to be seen whether this is a large enough
incentive.8
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. BARDA,
within the Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response in the US Department of Health and Human Services, is
tasked with enhancing development and purchasing of critical
vaccines, drugs, therapies and diagnostic tools intended for public
health emergencies. BARDA established the Broad Spectrum Anti-
microbials programme in April 2010, to develop novel antibacterial
and antiviral drugs to treat or prevent diseases caused by biological
threats.34 Their 2016 ﬁscal year budget was $182 million.8
BARDA’s Broad Spectrum Antimicrobials uses innovative business
models to establish public–private partnerships with industry, both
large pharmaceutical companies and SMEs.35 As the programme
began, it has assisted four candidate antibiotics from preclinical stages
to Phase III clinical trials and another candidate to late stage Phase I
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clinical trials. BARDA has established ﬂexible cost-sharing partnerships
with GSK ($200 million over 5 years) and AstraZeneca ($170 million
over 5 years) to fund an entire portfolio of projects.34,36 Although the
initial focus on defensive- and emergency-related drugs may have
limited the scope of its antibiotic R&D agenda, a 2014 presidential
executive order decoupled the need for BARDA-funded antibiotic
programmes to address both public health and biodefense
indications.35,37
United Kingdom initiatives
UK research councils. The UK Research Councils are responsible for
several key antibiotic R&D initiatives including the Cross Research
Council Initiative, the Global Challenge Fund and the Newton Fund.
Cross Research Council AMR initiative. The UK Cross Research
Council Initiative was founded in 2014 and involves all seven research
councils, using a thematic One Health multidisciplinary approach to
tackle AMR.38 It has subsequently expanded to include other UK
funders such as the UK Department of Health. This initiative offers a
range of direct funding to academics from small innovation grants to
larger collaborative grants. £46 million has been committed to projects
to date plus an additional £2.25 million via the Medical Research
Foundation AMR studentship programme. The Medical Research
Council is currently leading a £10 m call for proposals to tackle AMR,
focusing on interdisciplinary research relevant to low- and middle-
income countries.
This initiative uses push incentives in the form of direct funding,
targeting the early stages of the value chain (basic and preclinical
research). This collaborative approach, breaking down the traditional
health science R&D silos, allows the sharing of information and
resources between relevant stakeholders. However, the early stage push
funding does little to incentivise developers to commit to stewardship
and patient access goals.
Global challenge research fund. The Global Challenge Research Fund
is a £1.5 billion fund, established in 2016, to support research that
addresses the challenges faced by developing countries. Topics under
discussion include AMR. The UK Cross Research Council AMR
initiative that is focused on low- and middle-income countries will
utilise some of this funding.39
Newton fund. The Newton Fund, founded in 2014, is an initiative
intended to strengthen research and innovation partnerships between
the UK and partner countries. It has received funding ear-marked for
AMR from the UK research councils (£6.75 million), China (£4.5
million), India (£2 million) and South Africa (£0.25 million)—with
matched funding from participating countries. Further partnerships
are in development with China, India, South Africa and Brazil.40
The Newton Fund projects form valuable scientiﬁc relationships
and resource channels between the UK and low- and middle-income
countries, where a signiﬁcant proportion of the AMR health burden
exists. They address One Health priorities and some aspects of high-
priority medical need and antibiotic stewardship. The funding is
dedicated to academics, therefore, the initiatives do not actively engage
SMEs or large pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
National Institute for Health Research. The National Institute for
Health Research (NIHR) is a UK government body that receives
Department of Health funding to direct and coordinate translational
research programmes that beneﬁt patients in England’s NHS. AMR is
one of the key priorities for the NIHR and there are a number of
ongoing programmes.41 NIHR Biomedical Research Centres are
partnerships between an academic partner and an NHS host, which
aim to provide bench-to-bedside translational medicine; 4 out of the
20 Biomedical Research Centres’ focus on infection. Health Protection
Research Units, usually between universities and Public Health
England, have allocated approximately £8 million (2014–2019) to
two AMR Units. Furthermore, NIHR set out an AMR Themed Call in
2014 allocating approximately £20 million to 18 projects.41
These initiatives use push incentives in the form of direct funding.
They tend to target the earlier stages of the value chain but there is a
focus on bench to bedside translational medicine and applied research.
Regulatory body initiatives
European Medicines Agency. As the central drug regulatory body for
the EU, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is responsible for the
market authorisation of antibiotics submitted through their centralised
procedure on behalf of the European member states. The EMA
employs a number of lego-regulatory pull mechanisms to expedite the
market approval of novel antibiotics such as granting conditional
market authorisation for drugs that meet unmet medical needs.42
Earlier market entry may improve the revenue potential of a novel
antibiotic as the developer can take advantage of a longer effective
market exclusivity period. Although the faster approval periods can
increase access to needed antibiotics, it may come at the cost of
ensuring a high standard of safety and efﬁcacy.15 SMEs may ﬁnd these
mechanisms do little to help them move through the expensive clinical
phases of development.
US Food and Drug Administration. The US Food and Drug Admin-
istration is responsible for the market authorisation of antibiotics in
the United States and uses lego-regulatory pull strategies to accelerate
novel antibiotic development, targeting the later stages of the value
chain. The 2012 Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act allows
Qualiﬁed Infectious Disease Product designations to be granted to
unique drugs, which can receive priority review, fast-tract designation,
as well as a longer market exclusivity period.43 A further initiative
proposed under the 21st Century Cures Act is a Limited Population
Antibacterial Drug programme, which would provide a new approval
pathway to streamline the process of antibiotic development, allowing
faster access to antibiotics for patients with serious bacterial infections
lacking appropriate treatment options.44 The lego-regulatory policies
may not beneﬁt SMEs whom often lack the capital reserve required to
reach the clinical trial assessment stages.
DISCUSSION
It promising to see that there are multiple initiatives that offer valuable
incentives such as direct funding, R&D resources, open-source
collaboration programmes, ﬁnancial debt instruments and regulatory
assistance (Figure 3). All these incentives work together to reduce the
NPV of antibiotic R&D. However, as seen in Figure 3, there is an
uneven distribution of incentives employed by R&D initiatives. Most
of these incentives are push mechanisms that provide upfront
payments or indirect cost savings during the R&D process of basic
research and preclinical and clinical trials. Table 2 illustrates this issue
from a different angle; 71% of initiatives offer strictly push incentives.
Although push incentives are important and positively impact NPV, it
is recognised that to produce novel antibiotics a continuum of funding
is needed across the entire antibiotic development value chain from
basic research through to marketing. This issue is reﬂected in the
antibiotic development pipeline, which has few products in phases 2
and 3 of clinical trials, and it is uncertain if they will translate into
antibiotics available on the market.11
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There is even an imbalance in the distribution of push funding
across the development value chain. We found that most initiatives,
including the JPIAMR, CARB-X, DG-RTD, NIH, UK Cross Research
Council, Newton Fund and NIHR, are funnelling push funding into
the earliest stages of development: basic research and preclinical trials
(Figure 4). Kelly et al.’s27 analysis of European public funding of
antibacterial research found that 86% of national-level public funding
in antibiotic therapeutics was for basic research. The beneﬁciaries of
this funding tend to be academic research groups, instead of the
private SMEs, who often need push funding for translating this
research into useable products.45 In contrast, large pharmaceutical
companies are usually not incentivised to enter the market by push
funding, particularly early-stage push funding.
An emphasis on early-stage push funding was initially needed to
replenish the complex scientiﬁc groundwork and experimental com-
pounds needed to feed into the clinical development phases. However,
as more drug candidates move to the later stages of clinical
development, there is a critical need for early-stage push funding to
be pooled and re-allocated towards late-stage push funding to best
ensure that potentially valuable antibiotics make it to market. The
persistent overemphasis of early-stage push funding probably reﬂects,
in part, that basic research lends itself to being subdivided into
multiple projects that require smaller monetary commitments com-
pared to clinical trials. There are, however, lower success rates of
producing antibiotics at this stage than at later stages in the
development process. In addition, many of the funders of these
initiatives are public funders that can more easily support academic
work, which tends to focus on basic research. BARDA and the IMI’s
COMBACTE should be commended for their commitment and trans-
Atlantic cooperation to actively fund major clinical trials. These two
initiatives are the major late-stage push funders on the market. The
InnovFin Infectious Disease Facility is another programme that offers
some late-stage push funding for clinical trials through risk-shared
loans; however, Brogan and Mossialos33 raise several concerns
regarding the programme’s effectiveness. The current backing from
these few late-stage push funders is not nearly enough to effectively
facilitate antibiotic development.
Based on our assessment, there are limited pull incentives on the
market. Pull incentives are largely responsible for funding and
supporting the last stages of antibiotic development, including clinical
trials, market approval and commercialisation. Pull incentives increase
or ensure future revenue through direct outcome-based rewards, such
as prizes, or through lego-regulatory incentives, such as expedited
market approval procedures.15 Large pharmaceutical companies parti-
cularly beneﬁt from pull incentives which help guarantee a deﬁned
market for their product. These bigger ﬁrms need to earn approxi-
mately $800 million per year in revenues on a compound to consider
it proﬁtable.7,46–48 SMEs often only need $100 to $200 million
annually.46 However, SMEs can also beneﬁt from pull incentives that
guarantee a future return and can help them secure venture capital to
fund clinical trials. It is our opinion that the major pull incentives
missing from the market are value-based pricing and reimbursement
plans, advanced market commitments, tax incentives and large market
entry rewards. These could help balance out the current funding
support across the antibiotics value chain.
There may be a role for medicines with high global health value,
such as antibiotics, to be priced and reimbursed separately from other
health technologies. The prices and reimbursement levels of novel
antibiotics should ideally reﬂect the drug’s contribution to controlling
the global spread of AMR.49 Currently, most countries seem to include
antibiotics within their wider pricing and reimbursement policies that
aim to minimise drug costs and procurement inefﬁciencies. We
understand that determining an accurate premium is methodologically
challenging for national drug agencies and must reﬂect a country’s
individual health priorities and ability to pay. However, standardised
premiums can help realign antibiotic pricing and reimbursement for
innovative antibiotics and encourage companies to develop high-value
drugs.15 In addition, value-based pricing could be used in conjunction
with an advanced market commitment to procure and regulate a novel
antibiotic’s distribution.49 The UK Department of Health and the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence are exploring ways
to fairly value, price and reimburse novel antibiotics with ﬁndings due
by early summer 2018. BARDA and GARDP, the only two initiatives
that employ a push-pull hybrid of incentives, use advanced market
commitments alongside traditional push funding to guarantee a
market for certain low-volume antibiotics. This ensures that devel-
opers earn a reasonable revenue on their licensed product while
purchasers can partially contain prices on high-value antibiotics and
have some control over antibiotic consumption.
Our analysis did not identify any tax incentive policies that
speciﬁcally subsidise ﬁrms developing antibiotics. Tax credits, allow-
ances or deferrals are examples of pull mechanisms that can reduce a
company’s tax liability.15 We believe there is a role for coordinated tax
incentives in Europe that support ﬁrms developing and marketing
novel antibiotics. Tax incentives are highly ﬂexible instruments that
can be tailored to beneﬁt both SMEs and pharmaceutical companies,
as well as target the clinical trial and commercialisation phases.
Moreover, tax incentives do not require upfront payments by
governments.
Multiple major reports recommend that a programme of market
entry rewards is needed to adequately incentivise innovative antibiotic
development.1,7,8,47 At present, end prizes have only been used to
reward development of rapid diagnostic tools for infectious diseases,
the largest prize being the US NIH’s prize of $20 million.8 Proposed
individual market entry rewards for novel antibiotics range from $1 to
$2 billion per licensed antibiotic.47 Awarded antibiotics must meet a
pre-speciﬁed target product proﬁle and must be marketed according
to sustainability and patient access standards. Another sensible
recommendation is by Rex and Outterson who propose that market
entry rewards could have a baseline prize that is supplemented by
innovation bonuses for achieving certain clinical goals.50
Given stated goals of producing 10 to 15 novel antibiotics each
decade an effective market entry reward programme could cost
between $10 and $30 billion dollars over the next 10 years.47 This is
a signiﬁcant sum and the prize values and total reward pool will largely
depend on the ability of nations to pool their resources together in a
globally governed fund. Such a fund has been recommended in
numerous peer-reviewed articles, the AMR Review and BCG’s follow-
up report for the German GUARD Initiative.7,51 Beyond incentivisingFigure 3 Distribution of incentives employed by antibiotic R&D initiatives.
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antibiotic development, this fund could be used as a method of
purchasing or licensing out antibiotic patents and jointly procuring the
drug on behalf of participating countries.48 DRIVE-AB, a 3-year
research project funded through the IMI, will be releasing its ﬁnal
report in September 2017.31 Among other recommendations, the
DRIVE-AB team calls for the implementation of a market entry
reward and the report will discuss how to effectively design and
implement such a reward.
Despite all the academic literature advocating the need for a large
pull incentive programme governed by a global body, there appears to
be minimal political willpower, capacity and expertise to bring this
strategy to fruition. Instead, international agencies, national govern-
ments, NGOs and industry have been independently allocating their
funding to the multitude of available R&D initiatives. Consequently,
we are seeing the rise of numerous ‘global’ initiatives that largely have
the same goal: support R&D of antibiotics.52 On top of these
international initiatives, each country also has their own array of
national programmes. For instance, UK-based government organisa-
tions provide direct funding to the JPIAMR, GARDP and Global
Antimicrobial Resistance Innovation Fund, and indirectly to numer-
ous European initiatives such as the EDCTP, DG-RTD and IMI. The
UK Cross Research Council Initiative, Global Challenge Research
Fund, Newton Fund and NIHR are nationally run initiatives. There is
signiﬁcant risk of duplication of efforts with so many different
initiatives receiving interweaving national funding. Moreover, govern-
ments are now looking at their own national environments for how to
create local pull incentives. However, this may have a limited effect
and may not be a strong enough signal to developers that there is a
robust market for their products.
At the very least there is a need for a single global governing entity
that could coordinate disparate national and international antibiotic
R&D funding at a high level but that allows implementation at a
national or organisational level. Such a body could build on existing
co-ordination efforts, establish internationally agreed priorities for
antibiotic R&D, coordinate and streamline existing and new initiatives,
foster synergies between stakeholders and integrate R&D efforts within
the wider global AMR strategy. This is not intended to stiﬂe the
diversity of approaches needed to stimulate antibiotic innovation, but
rather provide a uniﬁed direction for these varying approaches. As a
bonus, a global governing body would be ideally situated to manage or
work alongside a global funding programme for market entry rewards
if political momentum gathered action through the G20.
With regards to lego-regulatory pull incentives, both the EMA and
Food and Drug Administration individually have several useful
mechanisms that expedite approval of high-priority antibiotics if they
were to reach the market approval stages. The Trans-Atlantic
Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance, a collaboration between EU
and US regulatory, funding and administrative bodies, is working to
harmonise the licensing requirements between the EMA and Food and
Drug Administration.42 Speeding up the approval process improves a
project’s NPV and can facilitate timely patient access to new
antibiotics. There are, however, several powerful lego-regulatory
incentives that are not being utilised including priority review
vouchers and transferable intellectual property rights.15 If governments
Table 2 Active initiatives based on their underlying incentives
Only push
incentives
Only outcome-based
pull incentives
Only lego-
regulatory
incentives
A hybrid of push–
pull incentives
Multi-
lateral
4 0 0 1
EU level 3 0 1 0
USA 1 0 1 1
UK 2 0 0 0
Total 10 0 2 2
Percent
of total
71.4% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3%
Figure 4 Distribution of multi-lateral, EU, US and UK antibiotic R&D initiatives across the antibiotic development value chain.
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are not willing to commit to signiﬁcant outcome-based pull rewards,
then priority review vouchers and transferable intellectual property
rights may be worth further exploring. The 2017 OHE report identiﬁes
transferable intellectual property rights as a promising incentive
mechanism.47
The ﬁnal elements that stand out as problematic in the current set
of initiatives involves the public health goals of targeting R&D towards
meeting medical needs, facilitating patient access to necessary anti-
biotics, and sustainable use of existing and new antibiotics. The recent
PEW Trust analysis suggests that the majority of antibiotics in the
development pipeline do not have activity against a Centre for Disease
Control priority pathogen or ESKAPE pathogen.6 Some initiative-
speciﬁc reasons that may contribute to this problem include: multiple
initiatives not having explicit links between their incentives and R&D
of high-priority pathogens (Table 1), the lack of coordination among
initiatives may be sending mixed signals about which pathogens
should be targeted and, ﬁnally, the over-reliance on early-stage push
funding makes it a challenge to control the direction of private R&D.
The recently released World Health Organisation Priority Pathogens
List should now serve as the overarching guide for initiatives in
prioritising funding allocation to R&D projects and be tailored to
national, regional or local needs.53 This list should be dynamic and
regularly refreshed in order to minimise the already extensive time lag
in antibiotic innovation.
Our assessment also determined that few R&D initiatives have
explicit sustainability and patient access policies. This may be because
sustainable medicine use and patient access are traditionally addressed
through public health policies. However, it is critically important for
R&D initiatives to support and reiterate other AMR efforts to have an
effective global strategy for tackling AMR.54 Most initiatives use push
incentives, which are usually impractical to link to post-approval
conditions regarding marketing practices or distribution of novel
antibiotics.45 Pull incentives, such as those discussed above, seem more
aptly suited to tying R&D funding with important sustainability and
access considerations that only become relevant when the drug is
marketed. Numerous strategies have been proposed that speciﬁcally
integrate sustainability and patient access policies into the R&D
incentive. It seems that the major obstacle of these strategies is their
implementation feasibility as they often involve public acquisition of
the rights to distribute the antibiotic. This poses a signiﬁcant risk to
industry and major upfront public cost to purchase this responsibility.
In-depth discussion of these different strategies is outside the scope of
this paper, but will be important to future incentive design and
execution.
CONCLUSION
The global community now recognises the seriousness and growing
threat of AMR. Many governmental and non-governmental initiatives
are committed to reinvigorating the antibiotic R&D pipeline. The
current set of R&D incentive programmes in place are laudable and
contribute to making antibiotic development an economically viable
business model once again. However, there are signiﬁcant holes in the
global incentive scheme that will impede progress towards bringing
novel antibiotics to the market. First, most R&D funding is through
early-stage push incentives for basic research and preclinical trials
whilst there is a lack of late-stage push incentives for clinical
development. Second, there are almost no large-scale pull incentives
that meaningfully encourage private investment in clinical trials and
eventual commercialisation of antibiotic products. Third, important
public health policies that stipulate target product proﬁles, sustain-
ability requirements and patient access are poorly integrated into R&D
incentive programmes. Lastly, there is minimal overarching guidance
and coordination across the active initiatives. This may be the key
reason behind the signiﬁcant gaps in the incentive structure and
unaddressed public health priorities. An international co-ordination
and governing body enabling national implementation would seem
best situated for resolving these policy challenges. At a national level,
countries need to individually adjust their funding commitment to
spurring antibiotic innovation in a way that more accurately reﬂects
the unrelenting global emergency of AMR. The time has come for
high-level commitments to be turned into real tangible actions by all
sectors.
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